Using LLMs to fortify cyber defenses: Sophos’s insight on strategies for using LLMs with Amazon Bedrock and Amazon SageMaker

Translate the following request into SQL
Schema for alert_table table
   
Schema for process_table table
   
Schema for network_table table
   

Here are some examples

Request:tell me a list of processes that were executed between 2021/10/19 and 2021/11/30
   SQL:select * from process_table where timestamp between '2021-10-19' and '2021-11-30';

Request:show me any low severity security alerts for the 23 days ago
   SQL:select * from alert_table where severity='low' and timestamp>=DATEADD('day', -23, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP());

Request:show me the count of msword.exe processes that ran between Dec/01 and Dec/11
   SQL:select count(*) from process_table where process='msword.exe' and timestamp>='2022-12-01' and timestamp<='2022-12-11';


Request:"Any Ubuntu processes that was run by the user ""admin"" from host ""db-server"""
SQL:
To evaluate a model’s performance on this task, we rely on a proprietary data set of about 100 target queries based on a test database schema. To determine the accuracy of the queries generated by the model, a multi-step evaluation is followed. First, we verify whether the model’s output is an exact match to the expected SQL statement. Exact matches are then recorded as successful outcomes. If there is a mismatch, we then run both the model’s query and the expected query against our mock database to compare their results. However, this method can be prone to false positives and false negatives. To mitigate this, we further perform a query equivalence assessment using a different stronger LLM on this task. This method is known as LLM-as-a-judge. 
Anthropic’s Claude 3 Sonnet model achieved a good accuracy rate of 88 percent on the chosen dataset, suggesting that this natural-language-to-SQL task is quite simple for LLMs. With basic few-shot prompting, an LLM can therefore be used out-of-the-box without fine-tuning by security analysts to assist them in retrieving key information while investigating threats. The above model performance is based on our dataset and our experiment. This means that you can perform your own test using the strategy explained above. 
Task 2: Incident severity prediction
For the second task, we assess a model’s ability to recognize the severity of observed events as indicators of an incident. Specifically, we try to determine whether an LLM can review a security incident and accurately gauge its importance. Armed with such a capability, a model can assist analysts in determining which incidents are most pressing, so they can work more efficiently by organizing their work queue based on severity levels, cut through the noise, and save time and energy. 
The input data in this use case is semi-structured alert data, typical of what is produced by various detection systems during an incident. We clearly define severity categories—critical, high, medium, low, and informational—across which the model is to classify the severity of the incident. This is therefore a classification problem that tests an LLM’s intrinsic cybersecurity knowledge. 
Each security incident within the Sophos Managed Detection and Response (MDR) platform is made up of multiple detections that highlight suspicious activities occurring in a user’s environment. A detection might involve identifying potentially harmful patterns, such as unusual command executions, abnormal file access, anomalous network traffic, or suspicious script use. We have attached below an example input data. 
The “detection” section provides detailed information about each specific suspicious activity that was identified. It includes the type of security incident, such as “Execution,” along with a description that explains the nature of the threat, like the use of suspicious PowerShell commands. The detection is tied to a unique identifier for tracking and reference purposes. Additionally, it contains details from the MITRE ATT&CK framework which categorizes the tactics and techniques involved in the threat. This section might also reference related Sigma rules, which are community-driven signatures for detecting threats across different systems. By including these elements, the detection section serves as a comprehensive outline of the potential threat, helping analysts understand not just what was detected but also why it matters. 
The “machine_data” section holds crucial information about the machine on which the detection occurred. It can provide further metadata on the machine, helping to pinpoint where exactly in the environment the suspicious activity was observed. 
 
 
{
    ...
  "detection": {
    "attack": "Execution",
    "description": "Identifies the use of suspicious PowerShell IEX patterns. IEX is the shortened version of the Invoke-Expression PowerShell cmdlet. The cmdlet runs the specified string as a command.",
    "id": ,
    "mitre_attack": [
      {
        "tactic": {
          "id": "TA0002",
          "name": "Execution",
          "techniques": [
            {
              "id": "T1059.001",
              "name": "PowerShell"
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      {
        "tactic": {
          "id": "TA0005",
          "name": "Defense Evasion",
          "techniques": [
            {
              "id": "T1027",
              "name": "Obfuscated Files or Information"
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    ],
    "sigma": {
      "id": ,
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_download_iex.yml",
        "https://github.com/VirtualAlllocEx/Payload-Download-Cradles/blob/main/Download-Cradles.cmd"
      ]
    },
    "type": "process",
  },
  "machine_data": {
    ...
    "username": 
    },
    "customer_id": ,
    "decorations": {
        
    },
    "original_file_name": "powershell.exe",
    "os_platform": "windows",
    "parent_process_name": "cmd.exe",
    "parent_process_path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "powershell_code": "iex ([system.text.encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('aWYoR2V0LUNvbW1hbmQgR2V0LVdpbmRvd3NGZWF0dXJlIC1lYSBTaWxlbnRseUNvbnRpbnVlKQp7CihHZXQtV2luZG93c0ZlYXR1cmUgfCBXaGVyZS1PYmplY3QgeyRfLm5hbWUgLWVxICdSRFMtUkQtU2VydmVyJ30gfCBTZWxlY3QgSW5zdGFsbFN0YXRlKS5JbnN0YWxsU3RhdGUKfQo=')))",
    "process_name": "powershell.exe",
    "process_path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
  },
  ...
} 
 
To facilitate evaluation, the prompt used for this task requires that the model communicates its severity assessments in a uniform way, providing the response in a standardized format, for example, as a dictionary with severity_pred as the key and their chosen severity level as the value. The prompt below is an example for incident severity classification. Model performance is then evaluated against a test set of over 3,800 security incidents with target severity levels. 
 
 
You are a helpful cybersecurity incident investigation expert that classifies incidents according to their severity level given a set of detections per incident.
Respond strictly with this JSON format: {"severity_pred": "xxx"} where xxx should only be either:
    - Critical,
    
    - High,
    
    - Medium,
    
    - Low,
    
    - Informational
    
    No other value is allowed.

Detections:
 
Various experimental setups are used for this task, including zero-shot prompting, three-shot prompting using random or nearest-neighbor incidents examples, and simple classifiers. 
This task turned out to be quite challenging, because of the noise in the target labels and the inherent difficulty of assessing the criticality of an incident without further investigation by models that weren’t trained specifically for this use case. 
Even under various setups, such as few-shot prompting with nearest neighbor incidents, the model’s performance couldn’t reliably outperform random chance. For reference, the baseline accuracy on the test set is approximately 71 percent and the baseline balanced accuracy is 20 percent. 
Figure 1 presents the confusion matrix of the model’s responses. The confusion matrix allows to see in one graph the performance of the model’s classification. We can see that only 12% (0.12) of the Actual critical incidents have been correctly predicted/classified. Then 50% of the Critical incidents have been predicted as High incidents, 25% as Medium incidents and 12% as Informational incidents. We can similarly see low accuracy on the rest of the labels and the lowest being bee the Low incidents label with only 2% of the incidents correctly predicted. There is also a notable tendency to overpredict High and Medium categories across the board. 
 
Figure 1: Confusion matrix for the five-severity-level classification using Anthropic Claude 3 Sonnet 
The performance observed in this benchmark task indicates this is a particularly hard problem for an unmodified, all-purpose LLM, and the problem requires a more specialized model, specifically trained or fine-tuned on cybersecurity data. 
Task 3: Incident summarization
The third task is concerned with the summarization of incoming incidents. It evaluates the potential of a model to assist threat analysts in the triage and investigation of security incidents as they come in by providing a succinct and concise summary of the activity that triggered the incident. 
Security incidents typically consist of a series of events occurring on a user endpoint or network, associated with detected suspicious activity. The analysts investigating the incident are presented with a series of events that occurred on the endpoint at the time the suspicious activity was detected. However, analyzing this event sequence can be challenging and time-consuming, resulting in difficulty in identifying noteworthy events. This is where LLMs can be beneficial by helping organize and categorize event data following a specific template, thereby aiding comprehension, and helping analysts quickly determine the appropriate next actions. 
We use real incident data from Sophos’s MDR for incident summarization. The input for this task encompasses a set of JSON events, each having distinct schemas and attributes based on the capturing sensor. Along with instructions and a predefined template, this data is provided to the model to generate a summary. The prompt below is an example template prompt for generating incident summaries from SOC data. 
 
 
As a cybersecurity assistant, your task is to:
    1. Analyze the provided cybersecurity detections data.
    2. Create a report of the events using the information from the '### Detections' section, which may include security artifacts such as command lines and file paths.
    3. [Any other additional general requirements for formatting, etc.]
The report outline should look like this:
Summary:
    
Observed MITRE Techniques:
    
Impacted Hosts:
    
Active Users:
    
Events:
    
IPs/URLs:
    
    
Files: